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We reviewed historical data from 2 smallpox out-
breaks in Liverpool and Edinburgh during the early and
middle years of the 20th century to assess their contribu-
tion to developing modern strategies for response to a
deliberate release of smallpox virus. Reports contempora-
neous to these outbreaks provide detail on the effective-
ness of public health interventions. In both outbreaks,
extensive contact tracing, quarantine, and staged vaccina-
tion campaigns were initiated, and the outbreaks were
controlled within 15 months and 3 months, respectively. In
Edinburgh, the number of fatalities associated with vacci-
nation exceeded the number of deaths from the disease.
In Liverpool, ambulatory, vaccine-modified cases and mis-
diagnosis as chickenpox resulted in problems with out-
break control. The relatively slow spread of smallpox, as
exemplified by the report from Liverpool, allowed for effec-
tive implementation of targeted intervention methods.
Targeted surveillance and containment interventions have
been successful in the past and should be explored as
alternatives to mass vaccination.
H
eightened awareness of the potential threat of biolog-
ic terrorism has generated debate over the most
appropriate modeling strategies to assist in planning pub-
lic health interventions and the required relevant data and
assumptions for model parameterization (1). A fundamen-
tal issue for modeling the potential impact of a deliberate
release of smallpox virus is the dearth of recent data. For
these reasons, the impact of a bioterrorist release upon a
modern population and of the subsequent attempts to con-
tain it are difficult to predict with precision. The dynamics
of disease outbreaks in the 21st century, and the outcomes
of control strategies used to contain them, have been pre-
dicted by using models parameterized with contemporary
outbreak data (e.g., measles immunization campaigns).
However, to obtain a better idea of how an eradicated dis-
ease, such as smallpox, might be controlled requires an
analysis of historical outbreak data, much as has been done
in a number of studies (2–5).
Inherent problems are associated with extrapolating
past data to the modern day, such as possible differences in
susceptibility to infection between modern and historical
populations (e.g., immunity) and also potential differences
in risk for disease transmission (e.g., changes in contact
patterns) (1). Nonetheless, when these factors can be
addressed properly, the advantages of using historical data
as a foundation for modern assessments far outweigh the
disadvantages. For smallpox particularly, epidemiologic
and outbreak data from the past have been largely relied
upon to provide insight into, and evaluation of, the effica-
cy and efficiency of different public health control strate-
gies for a potential bioterrorist attack. 
For example, the levels of protection afforded today by
smallpox vaccinations carried out many years ago are dif-
ficult to calculate, since few relevant recent assessments
exist. A recent study reported stable antiviral antibody and
slowly declining antiviral T-cell responses to vaccinia
virus in volunteers 1–75 years after vaccination (6). How
these longer lasting responses correlate with protection
from infection itself, from more serious disease, or from
death, remains difficult to determine. Natural exposure to
the organism is the only way to know whether this
response correlates to full (i.e., no disease), or partial (i.e.,
fewer deaths) protection from smallpox. Since data on nat-
ural exposure to smallpox virus are not available for con-
temporary populations, analysis of historical data is likely
to provide the most convincing evidence (3). 
Historical data on this and other aspects of disease con-
trol were published in the early 1900s after a variola major
virus outbreak in Liverpool (1902–1903) (7) and in the
mid-1940s after an outbreak in Edinburgh in 1942 (8)
(document available from http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/
vol11no2/04-0609.htm_app). These reports form the basis
of this article, which discusses the use of historical data in
predictive assessments of disease events. The Liverpool
smallpox outbreak data are included in a large section
specifically on smallpox in the annual Health Department
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Health in 1903, at a time when smallpox was still endem-
ic in Liverpool. The report covers all aspects related to
health, ranging from typhus and tuberculosis to rainfall,
temperature, and demographic statistics. Supplementary
information on this outbreak has also been taken from
Appendix 10 of the Annual Report of the Medical Officer
of The Local Government Board 1904-05, in Report on
Smallpox and Smallpox Hospitals at Liverpool, 1902–03,
which investigated specific aspects of the outbreak for the
local government board (9). A further report has also been
used, written in 1913 by the assistant medical officer of
health for Liverpool; it reports in greater detail on the
effects of the disease in relation to the impact of vaccina-
tion and includes a large series of cases from the
1902–1903 outbreak (10).
The report on the 1942 outbreak in Edinburgh also pro-
vides data on a range of important aspects of smallpox
control, including adverse events to vaccination (8). This
large report was written in 1944 by the medical officer of
health and his colleagues at a time when smallpox was no
longer endemic in the region. The stated purpose of the
report was to provide information for medical staff in the
event of future outbreaks. The information detailed, there-
fore, is more descriptive than that in the Liverpool publi-
cation but provides more data on the clinical and control
aspects used. Again, supplementary articles have been
consulted, primarily those concerning the contemporane-
ous outbreaks in Glasgow and Fife that led up to the
Edinburgh outbreak. A close evaluation of the 2 outbreaks
illustrates the value of using historical data when consider-
ing public health control and containment strategies for
potential bioterrorist events.
Outbreaks
Since the 1860s, Liverpool had had cases of smallpox
(7). According to the 1904–1905 report, seaports were
prone to occurrences of smallpox, and therefore, Liverpool
had “abundant opportunities of perfecting its administra-
tion in regard of this disease” (9). Although the annual
number of cases had declined considerably in the 17 years
or so before the outbreak began in 1902, a total of 23 cases
were imported by sea and 16 were introduced by
“vagrants.” However, according to 1 researcher, an epi-
demic broke out toward the end of 1902 (10). The outbreak
lasted from October 1902 to the end of December 1903
and resulted in 2,032 cases and 161 deaths (case-fatality
rate = 8%). The first smallpox case occurred in 1901 and
resulted directly from an imported case-patient, a merchant
seaman. This importation brought the disease into
Liverpool at the end of 1901, a year in which, until that
time, practically no smallpox had been reported (9). The
administrative actions of the Public Health Department of
Liverpool checked the spread of smallpox until November
1902, when an unrecognized case-patient (7), an infant,
was medically attended only when the child was dying of
the disease. In addition, 6 infected household members
were found, and subsequent house-to-house inquiries in
the district discovered another 20 clinical case-patients
during the next few days, most of whom were friends of
the infected family (7). This number of cases is assumed to
have resulted from chains of transmission beginning with
the infant and spreading through the family and to wider
contacts, rather than transmission from the child directly to
26 others. Despite attempts to prevent further spread, the
number of cases in the locality reached 99 by the end of
January 1903. The disease then continued to spread to the
east and south of the city, with the monthly number of
cases peaking at 356 in March 1903. The timeline of the
outbreak in relation to a number of other key events and
control measures is shown in Figure 1. 
Similarly, until 1905, Edinburgh had also seldom been
free from smallpox. Later, however, smallpox outbreaks
became infrequent, with only 4 outbreak years from 1905
to 1920, and then none at all in the 20 years before 1942.
The outbreak, therefore, was a relatively new experience
for a large section of the population (11). This outbreak
was relatively small and lasted 3 months (October
27–December 30, 1942), which resulted in 36 cases
including 8 deaths (case-fatality rate = 22%). Smallpox
had previously been imported into Scotland on May 29,
1942, by a ship arriving from Bombay into Scotland’s
other major city, Glasgow (resulting in 36 cases and 8
deaths) (12). In August, 3 weeks after the last case in
Glasgow, an outbreak was reported in Fife (29 cases and 8
deaths). As the outbreak in Fife was being brought under
control, the first case of smallpox appeared in Edinburgh
Royal Infirmary. The disease then spread to the hospital’s
convalescent home and then into the general public. The
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Figure 1. Timeline of Liverpool outbreak: key events and control
interventions, using hospital admission data (December 6, 1901–
November 27, 1903) (9). *House-to-house visitation of the district
"forthwith commenced" (7). Over the next few days, 20 more
cases were found and reported. means of the spread of disease from Glasgow to Fife and
then to Edinburgh, and from hospital settings to the gener-
al public, was, however, never identified. Indeed, for 8 of
13 Edinburgh community cases, the source of infection
was never discovered. The author of the outbreak report
conjectured that subclinical infections, i.e., “mild attacks”
or missed cases, might have been the reason for the lost
epidemiologic links but adds that these theories were hard
to reconcile with the facts (8). Atimeline of the Edinburgh
outbreak, highlighting the milestone events and control
measures employed, is shown in Figure 2. 
Vaccination Status of Population
To appreciate the course of the outbreaks and the sub-
sequent effects of the various control measures used, the
vaccination history of the populations involved should be
put into context. If we assumed that the level of infant vac-
cination in Liverpool was similar to that for England and
Wales as a whole in 1902 and 1903 (≈75%) when solid
immunity in the city might have ranged from 9% to 16%
(solid immunity, as termed by Dixon [13], is either 5 or 10
years of total protection from attack). However, at that
time, considerable support for the antivaccination cause
resulted in an infant vaccination rate in the late 19th cen-
tury that varied from 0% in some districts to nearly 100%
in others (13), and as the background rates for Liverpool
are not reported, being more specific about the levels of
vaccination that existed is difficult.
Vaccination levels also varied from region to region in
Scotland. The percentage of vaccinated infants in Scotland
was normally ≈30.7% (14); however, the Registrar
General for Scotland reported that 55% of infants were
being vaccinated in 1941. Whether this report is for
Scotland as a whole or for Edinburgh alone is not clear (8).
Dixon’s estimate of solid immunity for the whole of
England and Wales in 1947, assuming 40% of infants were
vaccinated, was 4%–7%. However, this percentage was
increased by the vaccination of National Service entrants
to ≈20%. For Scotland, with an infant vaccination rate of
≈30%, solid immunity would have been <20% (13). The
vaccinial state of the public as a whole was reportedly low
in the area around Fife (Methilhill), with only 20%–30%
of the population having been previously vaccinated; but
in towns nearer Edinburgh (e.g., Cowdenbeath) 40%–50%
had been vaccinated (14). 
Public Health Response
In both Liverpool and Edinburgh, phased public health
responses were implemented (Figures 1 and 2). In
Liverpool, at the earliest phase of the outbreak, with the
discovery of the first unreported case in Robsart Street
(Figures 1 and 3), active case finding in the local area was
instituted. One report states that, thereafter, usually within
an hour of notification, patients were removed to hospital
by ambulance, and the clothing, bedding, and dwellings
were immediately disinfected (9). An inspector followed
the ambulance and immediately made inquiries about pos-
sible sources of infection. Information about the state of
vaccination of possible contacts was then sent to vaccina-
tion officers; additional medical staff members were
employed at this time to assist with vaccination. These
vaccination officers in Liverpool first recommended
immediate vaccination or revaccination to all close con-
tacts of case-patients, then to related workforces, schools,
and the general public. Special arrangements were made
for the prompt vaccination of all vagrants coming into the
city, who were subsequently paid a small sum for consent-
ing. Offers of vaccination and revaccination to contacts
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Figure 2. Timeline of Edinburgh outbreak. *May 29: Revaccination
of all Edinburgh medical, nursing, domestic, artisan and ambulance
staff. Edinburgh Smallpox Hospital reconditioned and isolation units
set-up for observation cases (8). †June 30: great majority of other
essential personnel vaccinated (11). Some public vaccination by
private practitioners (≈4% [20,000]). ‡November 1: quarantine and
daily surveillance of (present and past) patients and visitors to
Royal Infirmary (8). ¶November 8–December 8: further vaccination
centers opened after 3 more cases occurred. Sixty sessions held
each day. One vaccination center reopened December 9–12 and
December 21–24 to cope with a few isolated cases (8,11).
Figure 3. Spatial-temporal distribution of incidence of smallpox
during outbreak, by district, Liverpool, 1902–1903 (7). *Incidence
of smallpox per district (per 100,000) calculated as number of
cases per district ÷ by district population x 100,000. New cases per
district were counted from the locations given on the 4 maps in the
original report for each of the periods above. District populations
were tabulated separately (7).and people living close to persons with smallpox were
reported in the Health Department Report to have been
promptly made and almost universally accepted; these
vaccinations were reported to have greatly limited the
amount of smallpox in Liverpool. As the number of cases
increased as the outbreak developed, hospital isolation
accommodations were expanded by committing an
increasing number of hospitals to the intake of smallpox
patients (Figure 1).
In Edinburgh, after notification of the first Glasgow
case on May 29(Figure 2), the first campaign of vaccina-
tion and revaccination for essential personnel (e.g., med-
ical staff, civil defense workers, and police), was agreed to
on June 30 and promptly instituted on July 1, 4 months
before the disease reached Edinburgh (11). Edinburgh had
not had a smallpox case for 20 years, but at this time, the
smallpox hospital was reopened, and satellite isolation
units in the hospital grounds prepared to receive patients
for observation. All contacts of Glasgow case-patients
arriving in Edinburgh were, as was routine practice, exam-
ined and put under surveillance. The Public Health
Department was responsible for the medical supervision of
contacts, and medical officers of health were responsible
for requesting precautionary behavior in the general pub-
lic. The second vaccination campaign took place from
November to December 1942, when the disease had taken
hold in Edinburgh itself. At this time the contacts of
patients were vaccinated, and vaccination was extended
subsequently to the general public with the opening, on
November 8 (Figure 2), of 22 vaccination centers through-
out the city. 
Despite the previous vaccination of infants and other
target groups, levels of immunity contemporaneous with
these 2 outbreaks were insufficient on their own to prevent
expanding outbreaks. Nevertheless, the spread of infection
over both space and time across Liverpool was character-
istically slow, taking 3 months to significantly extend out
of the district into which it was introduced, to more south-
eastern districts (Figures 1 and 3).
The first 2 cases in Edinburgh were diagnosed on
October 31. On November 1, active case-finding was initi-
ated with house-to-house searches, and a first aid post was
opened subsequently, which provided 8,000 vaccinations to
people in the area in which these patients lived. Family con-
tacts of patients were sent for observation to a prepared
reception house, which was opened on November 2, the day
after the first 2 cases had been confirmed (Figure 2).
Persons in the reception house were quarantined for 21
days, and all but 1 of their employers agreed to pay their
wages during this time (8). The exception to this rule attend-
ed work during the day and returned to the reception house
at night and was examined both upon leaving and on return-
ing for signs of infection. The Royal Infirmary convalescent
home also acted as an additional observation ward.
Contact tracing was an important part of the control
methods instituted in both outbreaks. In Edinburgh, the
press was used extensively as a means to trace contacts of
case-patients and to persuade large numbers of persons to
accept vaccination; the use of the press also allowed the
authorities to reach possible contacts with a minimum of
delay (11). In all, ≈1,700 contacts of the 36 cases were
traced and observed for 18 to 21 days, which represents an
average of ≈47 contacts per case. More than 900 persons
were traced as contacts and revaccinated from 3 cases
alone. Despite being infected, these ambulatory cases had
used public transport or been in contact with large numbers
of persons because of their occupation (8). The readiness
of the public to cooperate with all the above recommend-
ed, routine precautions is noted in the Annual Report, 1942
(11). The press was also used in the Liverpool outbreak.
Circulars that detailed the movements of case-patients who
had used public transport and the location and availability
of public vaccinators were widely distributed. Although
the total number of traced contacts is unclear, we know
that contacts were visited every day for 14 days after noti-
fication, and then every few days for a further 2 weeks. At
the peak of the outbreak, when 356 cases existed, as many
as 2,000 families were being visited daily, which repre-
sents an average of ≈6 families contacted per case. On the
basis of an average household size for England, at that
time 5, we have a rough estimate of 30 contacts traced and
vaccinated per case. 
In the Liverpool outbreak, the occurrence of a large
number of vaccine-modified cases caused particular prob-
lems for those attempting to control the outbreak, espe-
cially with respect to late or incorrect diagnoses.
According to Hanna (10), 72.7% of those vaccinated pre-
viously and 16.8% of unvaccinated cases were considered
to be “modified discrete and discrete smallpox” (modified
here meaning an accelerated clinical course compared with
expected course of ordinary smallpox, usually with fewer
lesions, not necessarily modified by vaccination) (13).
Chickenpox was a notable misdiagnosis in some instances;
2.6% of chickenpox diagnoses were found subsequently to
be smallpox (similarly, in the 1901–1902 London out-
break, the figure for the same misdiagnosis was 2.5%). To
help overcome this problem, chickenpox was made a noti-
fiable disease, provisionally in April, and permanently in
August 1902. Reporting of smallpox itself, however, was
not always straightforward in the Liverpool outbreak.
According to 1 author (9), the diagnosis of smallpox was
sometimes revoked upon admission to hospital, or vice
versa, a nonsmallpox case-patient was often treated as hav-
ing smallpox in the hospital. On at least 1 occasion, infor-
mation on patients treated in the hospital did not reach the
medical officer of health. In Edinburgh, the first 2 cases
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ticemia, respectively. Misdiagnosis as chickenpox is a con-
cern that continues to exist today. In Glasgow, in 1942,
severe vaccinial reactions, occurring at the end of the pos-
sible incubation period of smallpox, also complicated the
problem of diagnosis for medical practitioners (12). 
As with the 3 ambulatory case-patients in the
Edinburgh outbreak discussed above, such patients were
also a problematic source of infection in Liverpool (7,10).
Some smallpox infections were reported to be so mild
(usually vaccine-modified) that doctors were not consult-
ed, and patients and their household contacts continued to
visit public areas and shops. For example, 1 unreported
smallpox case occurred in a person whose family contin-
ued to go to work and socialize, which gave rise to 29 other
cases. Twenty prosecutions were instituted against mem-
bers of this family during the outbreak. The extent to
which ambulatory vaccine-modified cases might occur in
any modern day U.K. outbreak is not known. However, the
proportion of vaccine-modified cases overall would be
much less than in Liverpool because of the length of time
since the population was last vaccinated. This finding has
been discussed in greater detail elsewhere (2). 
Previous vaccination status also strongly influenced the
relationship between age at time of attack and death (Figure
4). In a study that examined a series of 1,163 case-patients
during the 10 years after the Liverpool outbreak (mostly
from the epidemic period 1902–1903), 943 (81%) had been
vaccinated in infancy, and 220 (18.9%) had not been vacci-
nated (10). Among those vaccinated in infancy, 28 (2.9%)
deaths occurred from smallpox, whereas among the unvac-
cinated, 60 (27.2%) deaths occurred. The case mortality
among the vaccinated rose steadily with age from the 20- to
30-year age group upwards to the >60-year group (no
deaths occurred in those <20), but never exceeded 10%.
However, among the unvaccinated, 58% of patients <2
years of age died, decreasing to 30.6% for those 2 to 5 years
of age. The ratio was lower (3.2%) for those 10 to 15 years
of age; the case-fatality rate rose (13%) for those 15 year of
age, and it was 50% for those >40 years of age. The effect
of vaccination on protection against death according to age
has also been noted by others (15,16). The level of partial
immunity to smallpox, i.e., protection from death as
opposed to protection from infection, in a modern popula-
tion may be higher than previously thought (1); spread of
infection from ambulant patients with vaccine-modified
cases may be an important and problematic means of trans-
mission (10,13,17), as has been pointed out in more recent
analyses (2). In the Edinburgh outbreak, 6 of the 8 deaths
from smallpox occurred in adults >20 years of age who had
been vaccinated in infancy.
No data concerning vaccine-related adverse events are
available from the Liverpool outbreak, but we know that of
the estimated 360,000 vaccinations (based on lymph issue)
performed in Edinburgh and adjacent counties (≈77% of
the local population), 10 vaccine-related deaths occurred;
8 of these were from encephalomyelitis. Compared to vac-
cination campaigns in England and Wales in 1951 to 1960
(18), the numbers of postvaccinial encephalomyelitis and
generalized vaccinia were much higher (Table 1). Indeed,
a similarly high incidence of postvaccinial encepha-
lomyelitis was reported during the Fife outbreak (14).
Approximately 78% of vaccinees in and around Edinburgh
had had a previously successful vaccination; the remain-
der, ≈22%, had either a previously unsuccessful vaccina-
tion or no vaccination at all. In neither of the outbreaks was
an intensified national vaccination campaign reported to
have been initiated. 
Discussion
In both the Liverpool and Edinburgh outbreaks, phased
public health responses were implemented, and the out-
breaks were brought under control within 15 and 3
months, respectively. Because smallpox arrived first in
Glasgow, Edinburgh health authorities had time to prepare
and implement a 2-phased vaccination campaign along
with active surveillance. For Liverpool, the report demon-
strates clearly that the spread of infection across the city
was slow, which suggests a relatively low transmission
rate and a characteristically long generation time, allow-
ing for targeted intervention methods to be effectively
implemented. By comparing the incidence of cases in dif-
ferent districts across the panels shown in Figure 3, the
outbreak appears to have taken 3 months (November
1902–January 1903) to spread into districts adjacent to the
origin of the outbreak and then an additional 3 months
(February–April 1903) to spread to more eastern and
western districts. The slow spread of smallpox described
here is not dissimilar to that described in studies in other
countries, for example, Pakistan and Bangladesh in the
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Figure 4. Percentage case-patient death rate by age in the vacci-
nated and unvaccinated, Liverpool outbreak, 1902–1903 (10).1960s (17). In Bangladesh, smallpox tended to be more
rapidly transmitted within family units but spread more
slowly between them (19).
Active surveillance, vaccination of contacts, and
prompt hospital isolation of patients were important
aspects of disease control measures in both outbreaks.
Indeed, the success of the surveillance-containment strate-
gy in Liverpool, the basis of which has been discussed
more recently elsewhere (20), was particularly noted by
the observers of the time (7,10). Unlike the situation in the
United Kingdom today, both Liverpool and Edinburgh had
designated smallpox hospitals, either already open or
ready to reopen, at the time of these outbreaks. These ded-
icated facilities must have contributed to infection control
efforts. However, control and containment procedures in
the 2 cities were hampered in both outbreaks to some
extent by reintroduction of the disease from other areas, by
patients with ambulant cases of mild infection (probably
vaccine-modified), and by missed cases.
These 2 case studies draw attention to issues of current
concern, not only to the potential impact of vaccine-modi-
fied cases mentioned above, but also to adverse events to
vaccination, both of which might have an impact in a mod-
ern-day outbreak. However, in contrast to these 2 out-
breaks, the fact that routine smallpox vaccination ceased in
the West during the 1970s brings complications of its own.
Persons <30 years of age have never received the vaccine
and are immunologically naïve. This 30-year time gap since
vaccination also has implications for the immune status of
previous vaccinees and the potential for adverse event and
disease complications and indeed for the spread of disease
among this population. If historical events are to be used as
sources of evidence, and the data from them extrapolated to
modern populations, they must be considered within the
ethical and social context of today, by observing societal
differences, expedited travel, waning immunity, and
increased recognition of contraindications to vaccination.
In particular, the number of people who are immunocom-
promised today continues to rise with the increase of HIV
infection, chemotherapy, immunity disorders, and trans-
plantations. So too has the number of people with atopic
dermatitis; in the United Kingdom alone, 2.3% of the pop-
ulation is estimated to have this condition (21). However,
cardiac adverse events to vaccination, such as myocarditis
and pericarditis, were not reported in these 2 case studies,
as has been seen in more recent vaccination efforts (22).
The studies also illustrate that the level of background
solid immunity in these populations was low and could
give rise to expanding outbreaks. The response to these
outbreaks was not to implement a national vaccination
campaign but rather a targeted approach, expanded when
necessary. Although these data, based on the direct experi-
ence of infected populations, are not truly predictive for a
modern smallpox outbreak (1), they are very instructive.
Analysis of the Edinburgh and Liverpool outbreaks
suggests that outbreaks after deliberate release of smallpox
virus may evolve over time. Therefore, sufficient opportu-
nity exists for targeted enhanced surveillance measures to
be put in place, for additional staff to be mobilized for an
effective follow-up, and for a containment strategy to be
implemented. The Liverpool outbreak took 15 months to
control; the one in Edinburgh 3 months. This time differ-
ence probably reflects that reintroductions of smallpox
occurred during the 1902–1903 outbreak because the dis-
ease was still endemic in the United Kingdom, poorer
socioeconomic conditions existed in Liverpool at this time,
and crowding was more prevalent, particularly in the dock-
land areas most heavily affected. By contrast in 1942,
smallpox was no longer endemic in the United Kingdom,
and socioeconomic conditions in Edinburgh were better.
One might hope for at least as swift an end to a similarly
sized modern-day outbreak as was seen in Edinburgh.
Modeling of data from other historical outbreaks of
smallpox may help to further develop targeted surveillance
and containment interventions for smallpox in the present
era (3,23). Such interventions warrant further investigation
because of clear, accumulating evidence of the substantial
disease and death likely to accompany any mass popula-
tion smallpox vaccination strategy.
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